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The prospect of a democratic developmental state in Nigeria and 
South Korea is in doubt, in part because of the existing structure of 
the post-colonial state, its conception of development, and politics.  
It is significantly so as democracy is not really central to the agenda 
of the state with respect to these countries.  Coupled with this is 
the wane of democracy globally, following its decline during the 
Athenian City-State [Aristotle: 1981].  Even liberal democracy, a 
correlate of the market, which the core countries of the North have 
been propagating in Africa and Asia has not actually taken root, 
because the intentions of the Western countries and the Bretton-
Woods institutions spreading this type of democracy are purely 
exploitative, and do not seek to enthrone democracy as such (Ake: 
2001, 1995, Lumumba-Kasongo: 2006, Heo and Stockton: 2005) 
It would be misleading, therefore, to argue that democracy has 
failed in Nigeria, because it never really got underway in the first 
place. In Nigeria, the state, which, ought to be central to the 
development and democratization project, remains as repressive, 
undemocratic and oriented to zero-sum politics as ever. The state 
does not really have development on its agenda. This is not to 
assume that the state has not formulated development plans, 
policies and projects; rather they only mimic the development 
models of the West, which cannot be replicated in Nigeria due to 
historical factors among others [Ake: 1985; Omoweh & Boom: 2005, 
Omoweh: 2005, 2006, Kaiser and Okumu: 2004]. South Korea is far 
from being a liberal democracy not because of its relative economic 
growth, but due mainly to its model of post-colonial authoritarian 
and undemocratic state. The kind of development promoted by such 
state can hardly be sustained as evident in the economic crisis of 
1997/8 from which it is yet to recover [Bang-Soon: 2003, Omoweh: 
2005]. Adequate scholarly and policy attention has to be paid to so 
many false starts that have characterized the construction of the 
developmental state, especially as the debate now emphasizes its 






Background to the Study 
In the received literature on the field, scholars have attempted to 
separate democracy from development in the formulation of the 
democratic developmental state as if they really mean different 
issues. Nothing can be more misconstrued, as democracy is only an 
instrument for the fostering of development, and indeed, a critical 
component of development. This raises serious theoretical problems 
that require scholarly attention.  
Given the political trajectories of both Africa and Asia, the focus 
should be on democratization rather than democracy. This is 
because democratization is ultimately about the empowerment of 
the people in governance and ownership of the sought development, 
while democracy is an ideal to which nations have aspired to attain 
without much success. Zeroing in on democratization, it can be 
argued that, although the processes and institutions that can 
enthrone democratization may have been created, the feasibility of 
a democratic developmental state is far from being realized, let 
alone tested, both in Nigeria and South Korea, not least because of 
the theoretical conceptualization of the state; and the 
conceptualization of the state with respect to the two countries.  
The state is used interchangeably with the government in the 
literature, whereas they connote different meanings. While 
recognizing the importance of the various institutions like the 
oligarchy, domestic bourgeoisie, fronts of local and foreign capitals 
as Miliband notes, and the structuralist perspective of Nico 
Poulantzas and the Marx Weber’s emphasis on the bureaucracy in 
constructing the state, there is the need to go beyond these 
conceptualizations in order to gain a deeper understanding of 
reconstructing the [democratic] developmental state [Miliband: 
1973, Poulantzas: 1969; Weber: 1964].  
Conceptually, the state is not the same as the government, because 
governments come and go, but the state, as a superstructure and 
public force, remains. Its materialist context frames the state’s 
development ideology and politics and that differentiates the state 
from the government. In fact, the government is only an organ of 
the state [Marx: 1978]. This is brought into greater relief when the 
question of who governs South Korea became critical as the economy 
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was sliding into crisis unfettered.  To Parvez Hasan, ‘the government 
is the senior partner and major participant who determined all that 
went on in the Korean economy for the Korean State’ [Hasan: 1976 
p.29]. 
The state is no less than a public force being propelled by 
institutional mechanisms and through which it [state] dominates and 
exploits the society for its class interests. Thus, the state is not class 
neutral, explaining why it cannot rise above its class interests in the 
kind of development that it promotes and the underpinning politics. 
Viewed in this context, the state cannot be objective in the sense 
that it uses the monopoly of coercion to police and guide the society 
impartially as misconstrued by mainstream scholars. Rather, the 
state is a specific modality of class domination, which autonomizes 
the system of institutional mechanism in order to dominate society 
for its parochial gains. [Ake: 1985; Omoweh: 2005].   
In practical terms, the state goes beyond the instrumentalist and 
structuralist conceptions. The state is basically the political 
leadership, constituted as it is by those who may not be in 
government but in power as they wield enormous political, economic 
and social power, and therefore, decide the kind, content and 
direction of development and politics, inclusive of the 
democratization project. The state also includes those persons 
elected or appointed into political offices, who, in most cases, are 
only playing out the scripts of their mentors and self interests, but 
obviously not those of the people. The state’s approach to 
development and style of politics stems largely from the nature and 
grim institutional struggles and competition for access and control of 
the state’s political power because it holds the key to wealth. The 
needs of the people hardly frame development policy, programmes 
and projects of the state under such circumstance. It is largely so, 
because a tiny cabal within the state structure, who, in most cases, 
dominates the entire political class and dictates the content and 
direction of politics and development has tenuous relationship with 
production. This accounts for why the tiny faction within the state 
structure clings on to political power by all means and at all cost, as 




Little wonder then that in some instances, the state resorts to 
repression, violence, and extra judicial methods for enforcing its 
policies, whenever the people resist such policies. State’s repression 
arises partly from the legitimacy crisis it suffers because the people 
vote without really choosing who rules them. This also accounts for 
why such state does not accommodate dialogue and debate, which 
are crucial democratic practices. The state conceives of 
democratization as a reduction in its power, especially if it is 
ground-up, as the people stand to be empowered by the process.  
It would be mistaken, therefore, to assume that a state is 
developmental simply because it establishes, as its principle of 
legitimacy, ability to promote and sustain development as Castells 
Emmanuel has argued with respect to the ‘Four Asian Tigers’.  
Emmanuel’s argument lacks the requisite insight into the kind of 
development being promoted, the interests it caters for, the process 
that led to such development and its sustenance (Castells: 1992). In 
fact, records of an impressive economic growth as scholars like 
Byung-Nak used in characterizing the Korean state as developmental 
can no longer be sustained after the country’s economic crisis 
(Byung-Nak: 1995). The Korean state’s experience with economic 
development, with its emphasis on industrialization, has only 
unearthed the lack of viability of Samuel Huntington’s 
‘authoritarian/hard state’ projects that he had advocated for 
developing countries, given the opposition to their quest for 
industrialization from the core countries of the North (Huntington: 
1991).  
Drawing on the experiences of Latin American countries with 
industrial and political development, scholars like Chalmers 
Johnson, and Frederic Deyo had faulted the ‘hard state thesis’ 
espoused by Huntington.  Referring particularly to the Asian Tigers, 
they argue that the state was anything but developmental and 
democratic (Johnson: 1995; Deyo: 1978).  Growth, they rightly 
assert, can make development possible, but growth cannot be 
equated with development, as Alice Amsden’s work on the industrial 
growth of South Korea would want us to believe (Amsden: 1989). 
African countries had, during the first decade of independence 
(1970s), recorded reasonable economic growth of about 3-5 percent 
especially from the agricultural sector, as evident in Cote d’Ivoire, 
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but growth did not really translate into economic development 
partly on account of the path the state took to development.  
According to Thandika Mkandawire, a developmental state is one 
whose ideological underpinnings are developmental (Mkandawire: 
2001). The trajectories of Africa and the Asian Tigers, however, can 
hardly be accommodated by his formulation, not the least because 
the kind of development being promoted by the state is hardly 
derived from the experiences of the people, nor enjoys any input 
from the people for whom the development is meant. In essence, 
the people did not own the development, but have had it designed 
and imposed on them by the state and the forces of transnational 
capitalism.  Unfortunately, liberal democracy has become one of the 
instruments for imposing the Western ideology of development on 
African and Asian countries.    
As noted, one major gap in the emerging discourses on the 
democratic developmental state is the tendency to isolate 
democracy and democratization and give them separate analytical 
focus. There is also the notion that the democratic aspect of 
development was not much emphasized in previous discussions and 
writings. To compartmentalize the debate is to weaken the 
theoretical strength of the concept. Rather, this paper seeks to 
deconstruct the concept of the democratic developmental state by 
addressing these issues holistically.  
Development is a political process.  It involves the rationalization of 
powers and interests, and the authoritative allocation of resources 
whether in the political, economic and social domains. The 
conception of a developmental state ought to pay attention to its 
ideological underpinnings, but that in itself does not make the state 
developmental. The state has to have the institutional capacity to 
undertake such development, and the ability to govern the 
development process in a manner that is participatory, accountable, 
responsive and consultative. Such development has to be owned by 
the people. The limits of the ‘hard state’ are not caused by the 
inability of growth to be transformed into development as evident in 
South Korea, but inherent in the path the state took to development 
and the contradictions engendered. Part of these contradictions is 
the undemocratic ethos the state has displays, particularly 
repression, and all-pervasive power.  
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In all appearances, the problem with democratization in Nigeria and 
South Korea is not about its necessity, but timing. The undemocratic 
credentials of the post-colonial state and its own conception of 
development have ‘blocked’ democratization from getting started, 
dimming the prospect of a democratic development state. This 
paper seeks to help fill such gap by examining some of the detours, 
miscalculations and false hopes about the democratic developmental 
state.   
 
Yet Another False Start? 
The Democratic Developmental State and Democratization  
Is the democratic developmental state not another false start? Why 
did South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia fail to avert the 
economic crisis of the late 1990s if the state were developmental? Is 
the post-colonial state undergoing rethink in the hope of forestalling 
future occurrences? What lessons have African state learnt from the 
Asian crisis? These research questions not only express the pessimism 
about democratic developmental state, but also, will help in its 
reconstruction.  
 
 The State and Development 
 In Nigeria, like in other African countries, the debates on the need 
for a ‘developmental state’ began in the late 1970s when the 
apologists of the military regime were of the view that Africa 
needed a ‘strong’ state to bail the continent out of the woods, citing 
the experiences of Asian countries like South Korea where the 
autocratic state had performed a great feat. The quest for the 
‘strong’ state in Africa was hinged on the ability and promptitude 
(without prolonged dialogue) with which it designs, imposes and 
perhaps, implements development policies, programmes and 
projects. Of the 46 years of Nigeria’s independence, 30 years were 
under military rule with all the traits of the sought ‘hard state’.  
Yet, 70 percent of the estimated 150 million Nigerians live on less 
than US$1.00/day with per capita income of US$250.00. The 
US$121.8 billion earned from oil exports between 1986 and 2002 did 
not reverse the worsening material conditions of the majority of 
Nigerians, as the country was ranked as the 26th poorest country in 
the world in 2002 (UNDP: 2000).  In essence, the weakness of the 
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Nigerian state, in spite of being repressive and autocratic, was 
identified as a major hindrance to the country’s development crisis 
when the state adjusted (Olukoshi: 1991).  The democratic 
credentials of the post-colonial state in Nigeria became a critical 
condition for the country’s development, which the return to civilian 
government in May 1999 was expected to help redress, but has 
compounded. 
 
The origins of Nigeria’s development crisis and why measures to 
remedy it have failed will not be understood in so far the symptoms 
of the crisis are being dealt with, leaving the political roots of the 
crisis untouched.  At the heart of the development crisis, is the 
Nigerian state, which sees development as its own exclusive 
preserve and conceives it in the image of the West.  Worse still, the 
state pursues development with a great deal of confusion of ideas, 
purposes and interests, and with policies ridden with ambiguities 
and contradictions that make the sought development impossible to 
attain. It is significantly so because the state is undemocratic, 
predatory, pervasive, all-powerful and sometimes, plays God, that 
is, all-knowing. The people, whose well-being is the raison d’etre of 
development, are excluded from the development, and are being 
developed against. Rent seeking is a preferred mode of surplus 
extraction to investing in production.  
Has the Korean state taken a different path to development? Not 
really. As a former colony of Japan, the Korean state was instituted 
by colonial capitalism, which in turn shaped the kind of 
development policies and programmes and the political leadership 
adopted in the post-colonial period. The Korean state’s experience 
with economic and political development was slightly different from 
Nigeria’s, a former British colony, due, in part, to the nature of 
global politics, security and the geo-strategic considerations. South 
Korea became politically independent from Japan in 1948, but was 
surrounded by Communist North Korea and China. In an attempt to 
stem Sino-communist expansion in South East Asia, the United States 
of America took charge of South Korea for another three years after 
its independence. The Korean state was constituted to be 
autocratic. The US installed a puppet president, Sygman Rhee, who 
was later toppled in 1961 by General Park Chung-hee for his inability 
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to reverse Korea’s deepening poverty and political crisis. 
To General Park, all that South Korea needed was an urgent 
economic growth. South Korea therefore, adopted a developmental 
state model, which, in practice, was a ‘bureaucratic authoritarian 
state’.  It was all the more so because Korea was a ‘late late’ 
industrializing country in post-1945 period. Under the bureaucratic 
authoritarian state, the government played centralized, 
interventionist and directive roles in the development process (Soh: 
1997). Government kept a tight grip on the organized labour and 
other organized interest-groups’ activities by using both ideological 
(anti-Communism) and physical coercion (military). National security 
(anti-Communist) and the Constitution were, and still are, used as 
excuses for continued dictatorship and the curtailing of workers’ 
rights.  
The Korean state’s conception of the country’s crisis as purely 
economic, engendered contradictions in its development strategy, 
as evident in its obsession with growth. The thinking of those 
entrusted with management of the state to, first, record growth in 
the economy before democratizing, raised more fundamental 
problems.  This is because the strategy used to grow the economy 
was itself political, though it presented itself as economic. For 
instance, the state’s policy to create the chaebols, which were the 
extensions of government, was sound in the face of the opposition 
from the West to Korea’s quest for industrialization.  As chaebols, 
they facilitated the state’s industrialization policy, particularly the 
heavy chemical industries that actually brought about the rapid 
economic growth that the country recorded in the late 1970s.  But 
the mega companies were not competitive as the state’s economic 
policies and some of them such as KIA and SYANGN collapsed as it 
(the state) rolled back from the economy in line with privatization 
and the pressure for opening up the Korean market to western 
capitals mounted. It was obvious that the economy suffered from 
limited liberalization, with the majority of the private sector firms 
left relatively weak and unable to continue with the gains generated 
from the state-led industrialization.  
That is not all. The efforts by the Park regime to civilianize himself 
resulted in bloody political contests within the political class 
inclusive of the military, all culminating in the assassination of 
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General Park in 1979 through a coup d’etat. Rather than abate, the 
political, economic and social crises in post-Park Korea escalated, 
bringing into the fore, the democratic deficits among other limits of 
the authoritarian state. The hyper-inflationary trend that was set in 
motion by the early 1980s, worsened throughout that decade. The 
crisis further deepened as the Korean state resisted the intense 
pressure to open its market for Western capitals, having joined the 
OECD. Korea was at a critical juncture of either retaining the iron 
curtain or pulling it down and risking the collapse of its fragile 
economy.  The smooth political transition that Korea has enjoyed 
since 1988 did not really strengthen the Korean state 
democratically, as the country has recorded significant democratic 
deficits. This and other related issues, the paper seeks to compare 
and contrast in constructing and deconstructing democratic 
developmental state in Nigeria and South Korea.  
 
Democratizing the State   
Across Africa and Asia, the majority of the political elites have 
openly declared their desire for a liberal democracy. They discuss 
liberal democracy with passion, emphasizing the centrality of power 
of the people to its success. Unfortunately, what is before us in both 
countries cannot be called liberal democracy. Democratization is 
hardly discussed by the political elites, but subsumed under the 
general discourse on liberal democracy.  Not surprisingly, the 
process of democratization has not really gone underway, with bleak 
prospects, therefore, for the realization of the democratic 
developmental state.  Perhaps much more problematic is the fact 
that not as much scholarly and policy attention as given to 
democratic institutions is accorded to the democratization of the 
state in the literature. The starting point for the construction of the 
democratic developmental state is actually the democratization of 
the state, which, in practical terms, is the political leadership as 
noted. It is all the more so because the average politician in Africa 
and South Korea still fits into the Hobbessian politics - and until such 
limitation is transcended, he can be anything but democratic in 




The ‘two turnover test’ says that, democratization begins with the 
exit of an authoritarian regime and ends after competitive elections 
have given rise to two successive peaceful transfers of government 
between contending parties’. There is also the view that, 
‘democratization is complete when all significant political actors 
accept that the electoral process has become ‘the only game in 
town for allocating public office’ (Whitehead: 2002 pp.26-27).   
Both definitions raise the concern of whether elections have seen 
the exit of the authoritarian state in Nigeria and South Korea. It 
questions whether democratization has begun in Nigeria after the 
country has had two consecutive elections in 1999 and 2003.  Has 
democratization been completed in South Korea, where elections 
have been peacefully conducted since 1988 to date? My answer 
would be an emphatic NO.  Once the politician assumes office or 
power, he runs roughshod of democratic practices.  What becomes 
development is his own imagination, but not derived from the 
experiences of the people.  In all, the people are seen as sub-human 
and do not know what they want.  This explains why the political 
leadership imposes their own idea of development (if any) on the 
people.  
 
Development is about people, their well being, rights and security, 
among others.  Democracy is only an instrument to achieve this and 
much more, but obviously, it is not an end in itself as the political 
elites often misconstrue it. Partly on account that the elections are 
won by dint of thuggery, money and violence, manipulation of the 
electoral system, but not based on their popularity, the majority of 
the political elites hardly relate to their constituencies and the 
people in whom ultimate political power resides; and when they do, 
they tend to see the people as servants.  Political parties (56 in 
Nigeria, and 9 in South Korea) have, rather than perform the 
functions of interest articulation, aggregation, political education 
and leadership training among others, become business ventures for 
the rich, irrespective of whether the party is in government/power 
or in opposition. Rather than being instruments for democratization, 
political parties even frustrate the democratic process and by 
implication, the envisioned democratic developmental state.  In 
Nigeria, the majority of the politicians who create political parties 
use them to actualize personal ambitions, because the initiator, 
founder, financier, chairman and presidential aspirant of the 
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majority of these parties are consummated in one person. That is 
why intra and inter-party politics and decision-making processes are 
personalized, acrimonious and undemocratic, and this is played out 
in political competition at all levels of government, sometimes, 
extending to the families.  The same is true of South Korea. In all 
appearances, these are precipitates of false starts in terms of 
possible democratization, as political parties have become vanguard 
for achieving personal ambitions, where voting is flawed, human 
rights are violated and there exists undemocratic constitution(s), 
exclusive politics, open discrimination against women by the male 
folks in seeking for political office, weak opposition parties, and 
corruption among other attributes in both countries, though with 
varying degrees.  
 
As rightly noted by Southall and Melber, the legacies of power left 
behind by the majority of African political leaders show that, 
instead of leaving office, they tend to continue to ‘stay in power’ 
and manipulate the process of succession politics inclusive of the 
Parliament, for their parochial interests (Southall and Melber: 2006). 
This is not peculiar to Africa: It equally is a major problem in Asia. 
All has grave consequences for the sought democratic developmental 
state in Africa and Asia.   
 
In deconstructing the democratic developmental state, the 
democratization of the political leadership is key because the 
political elite has, in the first instance, to imbibe democratic 
principle, values and practices if it is to manage democratic 
institutions effectively. The creation of democratic institutions can 
only lead to democratization if the political elites are democratic in 
thought and action.  That they are not democratic in this manner 
partly accounts for why the workings of the institutions like the 
Parliament, political parties, executives, the judiciary, are hardly 
guided by democratic principles and practices like broad-based 
participation and dialogue, accountability, transparency, 
responsiveness, open and successive politics.  
 
As used in this paper, therefore, democratization is concerned with 
the empowerment of the people to participate in politics and 
development generally.  Democratization is an instrument for 
achieving a people-centered development.  To democratize the 
polity entails, among others, a broad-based participation in politics, 
which allows the people to freely choose who governs them, and are 
also at liberty to bring their leaders and representatives to book for 
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their actions.  If the actions, policies, programmes of the 
governments, and the political violence and protests in Nigeria and 
South Korea are aimed at achieving all this, then democratization is 
feasible in both countries. To democratize development is to enable 
the people decide the kind of development they want; and they 
become the essence of the development. Part of the 
democratization of development is to democratize the polity, 
particularly opposition politics, because it spices democratic 
practices, promotes healthy political competition, and helps sustain 
democratic transition. Democratizing the opposition also serves as a 
training ground for a shadow government, good governance, 
democratic politics and participatory development with prospect for 




Analysis of the Problem  
The thesis of ‘blocked democratization’ does not foreclose the 
conduct of politics and politicking in Nigeria and South Korea.  Of 
course, multiparty system, one of the conditions for 
democratization, is in operation in both countries.  Opposition 
politics is still emerging.  At one historical time or the other, 
experiments with democratization have been labeled as liberal, 
illiberal, semi and embryonic. Irrespective of these labels, a 
transition process is underway that is altering the authoritarian 
structures developed during the period of the first generation of 
political leadership in both Nigeria and South Korea.  Elections 
remain the ‘only game in town’ in allocating public offices. There is 
a consensus of opinion among the political elites that there is no 
respectable alternative to democracy as a form of government.   
 
However, the state still approaches development as its preserve, 
formulates and imposes its kind of development, which mirrors the 
West, on the people. It suffocates the process of participation, 
ownership and renewal, and indeed, the democratization of the 
governance of the development process. The state can profess to be 
democratic in thought, but obviously not in action, as it conceives of 
politics as winners-take-all; and as a means to wealth. Either in 
government and in power, or outside of power; or either acting in 
fulfillment of its parochial interests, or as a proxy to subterranean 
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forces, the state stifles the process of democratization from getting 
underway, because it sees democratization, which ultimately 
empowers the people, as a reduction in its power.  Just as the state 
is threatened because of changes in the political system, which 
seeks to democratize how the system legislates, formulates, 
implements policies and the people gain access to power. The state 
can embark on a political transition only in terms of individuals and 
holding different political offices, but not a genuine change in 
leadership and political system along democratic practices, as the 
acrimony between the authoritarian incumbents and opposition will 
continue to deepen. All frames, in part, the democratization crises 
in Nigeria and South Korea. It is within this context that the 
deconstruction of the democratic developmental state is undertaken 
in both countries.  
 
Conclusion 
An attempt is made in this paper to deconstruct the concept of 
democratic developmental state in Nigeria and South Korea.  To do 
so, the paper has sought to examine in a comparative perspective, 
the origin, nature and politics of the post-colonial states in both 
countries and the path they took to development and politics. In 
particular, it examines the nature of the democratization crises of 
the state with emphasis on the openness of the political space; the 
political parties’ politics; opposition politics; and the national 
political leadership. It suggests strategies that might permit the 
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